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ROBERT A. BURT* 
"If you can keep calm when everyone around you is losing it, 
then you don't really understand the situation." So goes the mod­
em variation on the old saying, but the dominant vocabulary in our 
contemporary public discussions about physician-assisted suicide ig­
nores this wisdom. In litigative or academic forums, the talk tends 
to focus on abstract principles and hypothetical cases. It is the ab­
stractions and hypotheticals that obscure the complexity, the gritti­
ness, and the disturbing reality of this subject. To remain coolly 
rational about physician-assisted suicide is, in a fundamental sense, 
to misunderstand all that is truly at stake. 
Constitutional adjudication is especially vulnerable to this kind 
of rationalistic and distanced misunderstanding. The judicial delib­
eration revealed in the Ninth and Second Circuit court opinions is a 
prime example of this affliction.! Consider the way that both courts 
addressed whether withholding or withdrawing life-prolonging 
medical treatment was different from providing treatment intended 
to hasten death. Both courts asserted that there was no logical dif­
ference between physicians' conduct in these two circumstances.2 
The Second Circuit made this logical claim the center-piece of its 
ruling that it was irrational for the state to authorize physicians to 
withhold or withdraw care while prohibiting assisted suicide. 
It is of course true that under both circumstances, the patient's 
death is the foreseeable result of the physician's conduct and in this 
sense, at least, there is no difference between the two circum­
stances. But when the courts asserted that there were no other sali­
ent or important differences between the physician's conduct under 
the two circumstances, they ignored the testimony of many physi­
cians-including the assembled representative physicians in the 
* Alexander M. Bickel Professor of Law, Yale University. 
1. See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 138 L. Ed. 2d 834 (1997); 
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom. Wash­
ington v. Glucksberg, 138 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1997). 
2. See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 822-23; Quill, 80 F.3d at 728-30. 
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American Medical Association3-that acquiescing in a patient's re­
fusal of life-saving treatment feels different from injecting or even 
prescribing lethal medication at a patient's request. Perhaps the 
distinction is irrational; perhaps it is logical to.say that the physician 
is killing the patient in both cases. However, overriding the as~ 
serted difference on logical grounds amounts to a claim that the 
public forum's distinctively abstract and remote mode of talking 
about these events is the correct mode of understanding. 
If we give ourselves room for the disturbing, unsettling, and 
often powerfully irrational elements that attend the intimacies of 
the death watch, we would-and I believe we should-be much 
more respectful of this testimony froin physicians. More than most 
people, physicians are in regular and recurrent contact with death. 
This does not mean that most physicians are comfortable with this 
contact.4 Relentless technological assaults against the possibility of 
dying, and refusals to ever acquiesce in the inevitability of death, 
are common behavior among physicians. The very relentlessness of 
this physician behavior speaks to the disturbing and aversive char­
acter of their confrontations with death. During the past two de­
cades, many people outside and inside the medical profession have 
struggled to change this technological assaultive ethos and to make 
physicians more comfortable with acquiescing in the inevitability of 
death and remaining available to comfort their dying patients. One 
of the principal instruments for promoting this change has been to 
cultivate physicians' respect for patients' wishes to refuse or to dis­
continue life-prolonging treatments. This cultivation has itself not 
been easy to accomplish, even though its logical force seems unas­
sailable. In the words of a 1970s Broadway play later made into a 
popular movie, the core question should be "Whose Life Is It, Any­
way?" The obvious logical answer to this question is that the life is 
the patient's not the physician's; therefore, the patient should de­
cide what the physician can and cannot do to prolong his life. 
Whatever the source for physicians' resistance to this logic, 
that resistance has been strong and has not been overcome in the 
3. See Council on Scientific Affairs, American Med. Ass'n, Good Care o/the Dy­
ing Patient, 275 JAMA 474, 477 (1996); see also Amicus Curiae Brief of the American 
Medical Association et aI., app. B at 11a, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Q. 36 (1996) (No. 95­
1858). 
4. See generally FREDERIC W. IiAFFERTY, INTO THE VALLEY: DEATH AND THE 
SOCIALIZATION OF MEDICAL STUDENTS (1991). 
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day-to-day practice· of medicine.s This resistance persists even 
though the abstract principle has been unanimously endorsed in al­
most every imaginable public forum-including the Supreme Court 
in its 1990 Cruzan opinion which assumed, though it did not quite 
proclaim, that patients had a constitutionally protected liberty in­
terest to refuse life-prolonging medical treatment.6 Nevertheless, 
for some set of stubbornly persistent reasons, many physicians have 
difficulty in acting on the rational premise that, in their struggles 
against illness and death, only the patient's life is at stake.7 
As a society we may be close to overcoming this physician 
resistance; it may be that the principle of respect for patient's 
wishes to terminate treatment and accept the inevitability of death 
is now within the possibility of realization in the practice of 
medicine. I am convinced that this is a correct principle and a 
5. See Mildred Solomon et aI., Decisions Near the End of Life: ProfesSional Views 
on Life-Sustaining Treatments, 83 AM. J. Pus. HEALTH 14 (1993). Solomon notes that: 
[p]hysicians and nurses hold some views that make it difficult for them to act 
in ways that would be consistent with their own expressed support for patient 
autonomy. Although clinicians' views are congruent in many ways with those 
put forth by authorities in ethics and law, on at least three critical issues­
withdrawal of treatment, the distinction between 'ordinary' and 'extraordi­
nary' treatment, and the provision of nutrition and hydration-many clinicians 
differ with current national recommendations .... Most clinicians interviewed 
were uncertain about what the law, ethics, and their respective professional 
standards say. . .. In addition to this uncertainty, the interviewed respondents 
reported being less likely to withdraw treatments than to withhold them for a 
variety of other reasons, including psychological discomfort with actively stop­
ping a life-sustaining intervention; discomfort with the public nature of the act, 
which might occasion a lawsuit from disapproving witnesses even if the deci­
sion were legally correct; and fear of sanction by peer review boards. 
Id. at 19. 
6. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). The 
Court in Cruzan stated: 
[T]he principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected lib­
erty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our 
prior decisions . 
. . . [F]or purposes of this case, we assume that the United States Constitution 
would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse 
lifesaving hydration and nutrition. 
Id. at 278-79. 
7. Commentators have reported that 
[S]ome of the physicians expressed discomfort about openly soliciting patients' 
views on what would constitute an acceptable quality of life. They tended not 
to acknowledge explicitly to patients (or their families) that many termination­
of-treatment decisions involve personal judgments about quality of life as well 
as clinical considerations about medical efficacy. 
See Solomon et aI., supra note 5, at 19. 
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wholesome corrective to past assaultive medical practices. For the 
moment, moreover, I am prepared to assume that the resistance of 
many physicians (and non-physicians) to acknowledge the logical 
equivalence of acting on a patient's wish to refuse life-prolonging 
treatment and a patient's wish to obtain death-dispensing treatment 
is itself irrational. Does it then follow that the proper course of 
action, as the Second and Ninth Circuit courts have held, is to over­
ride this illogical resistance and to proclaim that because patients 
have a right to discontinue life-prolonging medical treatment, they 
also have an equivalent right to physicians' assistance in hastening 
death? 
The Fourteenth Amendment demands that all persons be guar­
anteed the equal protection of the laws. The constitutional syllo­
gism would thus appear to require that irrational distinctions 
between logically equivalent people must be overturned. If the 
law's logic is the proper way to think about physician-assisted sui­
cide, then judicial invalidation of the state prohibitions would seem 
to follow ineluctably. 
But I want to explore a different kind of logic for thinking 
about this issue: a logic that starts from the premise that death is a 
deeply disturbing event for all its witnesses. I want to explore what 
we might call a logic of irrationality. I must of course speculate in 
this exploration. We know that most people find it disturbing to 
confront death, and that physicians in particular experience consid­
erable discomfort. There is, however, very little firm data explain­
ing the sources of this discomfort; and, in particular, there is almost 
no data about the psychological impact on physicians when they 
view themselves as responsible for, or as participants in, their pa­
tients' deaths.s We do know that physicians work strenuously to 
avoid the death of their patients; this is the normatively approved 
social role of physicians, and not aberrational or irrational conduct. 
We also know that in pursuing this socially sanctioned goal, many 
physicians have been unwilling to accede to, or even to acknowl­
edge the existence or propriety of, patients' refusals of life-prolong­
ing medical treatment.9 
8. See, e.g., Miles Edwards & Susan Tolle, Disconnecting a Ventilator at the Re­
quest ofa Patient Who Knows He Will Then Die: The Doctor's Anguish, 117 ANNALS OF 
INTERNAL MED. 254 (1992). 
9. See Howard Brody et aI., Withdrawing Intensive Life-Sustaining Treatment­
Recommendations for Compassionate Clinical Management, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 652 
(1997) ("[Hospital s]taff members are highly skilled in aggressive life-extending treat­
ment . . .. Forced to choose between what they were trained to do and what they were 
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I would speculate that this stubbornly persistent unwillingness 
among physicians is based on a widespread belief that their acquies­
cence in patients' refusals would somehow render physicians re­
sponsible for, and direct participants in, their patients' deaths. It is 
easy to identify the logical error in this belief. A patient and his 
physician are separate individuals; and when the patient makes an 
autonomous choice for death, that decision is his responsibility 
alone. 
What if there is a different logic at work between many physi­
cians and patients, a logic of irrationality arising from the psycho­
logical stress of impending death and its attendant dissolution of the 
conventionally perceived boundaries of an "intact self"? What if 
this irrational sense of dissolved boundaries is especially salient to 
physicians as a group, more so than to patients, because the daily 
work of physicians brings them constantly into contact with dYing 
and its attendant stresses? This might explain the persistent unwill­
ingness among physicians to acknowledge that their autonomous 
patients were alone responsible for choosing their deaths.10 If this 
explanation is credible, what will happen to this widespread belief 
in the new era-this relatively recent and still imperfectly imple­
mented era-when physicians are normatively obliged to assent to 
their patients' decisions to refuse life-prolonging treatment? Here 
are two possibilities: (1) perhaps physicians who have strenuously, 
and until quite recently, ignored the logical proposition that they 
and their dying patients are autonomously separate individuals, will 
suddenly awaken to the force of this proposition, and will no longer 
be afflicted by their past irrational views; (2) or perhaps physicians 
still hold this irrational view, confusing themselves with their dying 
patients, but this persistent irrationality will find a different expres­
sion in this new era of mandated respect for patients' autonomous 
rights. 
never trained to do, physicians and nurses may continue aggressive therapy well beyond 
the point at which patients or families (or the health care professionals themselves) 
would prefer to stop."); see also Alfred Connors et aI., A Controlled Trial to Improve 
Care for Seriously fll Hospitalized Patients: The Study to Understand Prognoses and 
Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of Treatments (SUPPORT), 274 JAMA 1591,1594 
(1995) (providing statistics showing that when patients expressed preferences to various 
hospital staff members for withholding cardiopulmonary resuscitation, "only 47% of 
their physicians accurately reported this preference"). 
to. For a speculative exploration of the psychology of boundary dissolutions in 
interactions between patients and physicians where death is inevitable, see ROBERT A. 
BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RULE OF LAw IN DOcrOR-PATIENT RELA­
TIONS 92-123 (1979). 
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If the first possibility is the truth of the matter, then we might 
confidently conclude that, whatever other objections might be con­
sidered regarding physician-aSsisted suicide, we should acknowl­
edge the logical equivalences between physician involvements in 
patient deaths, whether those deaths occur through physicians' ac­
tions withdrawing a ventilator or injecting lethal medication. If, 
however, the second possibility is the truth, then we should hesitate. 
I do not know which possibility is the truth. It is extraordina­
rily difficult for anyone to know this truth-to discern the existence 
and the practical consequences in action of subjective attitudes 
among individuals, much less among collectivities. We run consid­
erable personal and social risks, however, if we ignore the subjec­
tive dimensions of our individual and collective lives, if we assume 
that rational objectivity will govern our conduct simply because we 
believe it should do so, or judges tell us it must do so. 
Let me articulate one speculation about the possible harm that 
would fall on many patients with life-threatening illnesses if physi­
cian-assisted suicide were to be legally approved, notwithstanding 
the persistence of irrational confusions between physicians and pa­
tients. If numerous physicians have resisted acknowledging their 
patients' wishes for death because of some deep subjective convic­
tion that this acknowledgment would compromise the physicians' 
own struggles against feared death-if, we might say, the physi­
cians' empathic identification with their patients spilled into an 
over-identification with them-then the physicians who now under­
stand themselves to be participating in their. patients' deaths 
(whether by acquiescing in their treatment refusals or by engaging 
in some more active assistance) must somehow accommodate their 
prior over-identifications with patients. One possible route is to re­
lent in their prior resistance to patients' deaths by denying any em­
pathic identification with them-by, we might say, an under­
identification with patients, by a heightened aversion to the possi­
bility of death that finds expression as a too-quick support for the 
patients' hastened death and disappearance in order to deny the 
force of the persistent underlying belief that the patients' death 
threatens the physicians' personal integrity. 
There are already many identifiably powerful social pressures 
that are conspiring toward this speeded end: financial pressures 
from the new organizational structure of health care services into 
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managed care settings that reward nontreatment of patients,ll the 
socially marginalized and devalued status of many dying people 
such as the impoverished elderly in nursing homes and AIDS-in­
fected drug abusers; and the heightened public fears about the dy­
ing process that have made Jack Kevorkian a folk hero, in the 
media and before successive criminal juries, notwithstanding his ob­
vious flouting of legal constraints and his bizarre personal charac­
teristics.12 The "conscience of the medical profession" has often 
been invoked as a claimed counterweight to these social forces 
pressing toward hastened deaths of patients; but this counterweight 
disappears if physicians can persuade themselves that morality de­
mands acquiescence in their patients' expressed wishes for death, 
no matter how tentative, ,ambivalent, or premature those expressed 
wishes might be. What a happy conjunction, then, if "doing good" 
for one's patients~oing the socially approved act of hastening the 
patient's death-also "felt good" to the physician who, by this has­
tening, could avoid any anxiety-provoking acknowledgment of the 
personal threat embodied in the patient's death. 
The conjunctive impact of these psychological forces with 
other social pressures toward hastening the death of vulnerable pa­
tients would create considerable problems not only for the proper 
implementation of legally recognized physician-assisted suicide but 
also for patients' legal rights to refuse treatment. The Second Cir­
cuit glibly concluded that because "[t]here is no clear indication 
that there has been any problem" regarding implementation of the 
widely recognized legal right to refuse treatment,' "there should be 
none" as to physician-assisted suicideP But we know that there 
11. See, e.g., Steven Miles et aI., End-of-Life Treatment in Managed Care: The 
Potential and the Peril, 163 W.J. MEn. 302 (1995). 
12.. See, e.g., Keith Bradsher, Kevorkian Is Also Painter. His Main Theme Is 
Death, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1997, at A10 (describing a public exhibit of his "oil paint­
ings depicting severed heads, moldering skulls and rotting corpses" including a "paint­
ing about genocide [for which] Dr. Kevorkian said that he had drawn blood from his 
own veins to stain the pine frame .... '1 wouldn't recommend anyone hanging them on 
a wall,' he said at a press preview on Saturday. 'They're for enjoying; they're for 
thinking. "'). 
13. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 730 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 138 L. Ed. 2d 834 (1997). 
The court stated, 
Physicians do not fulfill the role of "killer" by prescribing drugs to hasten . 
death any more than they do by disconnecting life-support systems. Likewise, 
"psychological pressure" can be applied just as much upon the elderly and 
infirm to consent to withdrawal of life-sustaining equipment as to take drugs 
to hasten death. 
Id. 
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are current widespread problems in implementing the refusal right. 
The problems, at the moment, are excessive physician omis­
sions rather than commissions-extensively documented failures by 
physicians generally to understand clearly stated legal rules that pa­
tients are as much entitled to discontinue treatment as to refuse its 
initiation14 and, in large numbers of individual cases, physicians' 
failures to acknowledge patients' expressed wishes to refuse or dis­
continue treatment.15 Many people see these failures as evidence 
of physician stubbornness, even arrogance, and wrongdoing. From 
the alternative perspective that I have been pursuing here, these 
failures would convey a different implication. Physicians' mis­
perceptions of the legal rules and of their patients' wishes to refuse 
treatment, and their resistance to this acknowledgement might indi­
cate many physicians' persistent inability to draw objective, logical 
distinctions between their patients' lives and their own, between 
their own safety and their patients' vulnerability: their continued 
confusion about "whose life is it, anyway." From this perspective, 
the intensity with which many physicians insist on the sharp differ­
entiation between "passive acquiescence" in their patients' refusal 
of life-prolonging treatment and "active assistance" in hastening 
their patients' death may be part of the physicians' intense struggle 
to differentiate themselves from their dying patients. Drawing 
sharp lines (even obviously illogical lines) about different degrees 
of involvement in patients' deaths may be an instrument in a diffi­
cult struggle to hold fast to their traditional ways of maintaining 
psychological balance in facing the unsettling force of death. 
Even if these psychological speculations were true, this would 
not necessarily be a convincing argument for indefinite mainte­
nance of obviously illogical distinctions. But if these distinctions 
are, as I speculate, playing an important psychological role for 
many physicians' conceptions of themselves as different from, and 
safely distant from, the dying of their patients; and if the legal sys­
tem overrides these distinctions and deprives many physicians of 
their customary self-protective instruments, then we must expect 
physicians to satisfy these persistent psychological needs in some 
other way. It is not at all clear that patients at death's edge would 
be better protected under this new regime. This new regime may 
help some patients. It may be that some patients-those who are 
14. See generally Solomon et aI., supra note 5 (providing statistics regarding the 
state of physicians' knowledge and understanding of patients' legal rights). 
15. See Connors et aI., supra note 9, at 1594. 
361 1997] RATIONALITY & INJUSTICE 
clearly in command of themselves, and firmly want or firmly refuse 
hastened death-can, by their assured self-definitions, resist the 
force of their physicians' confusions and cognitively unacknowl­
edged self-protective maneuvers. More vulnerable patients would 
perhaps be swept into a folie a deux with their physicians and bear 
the heaviest burden of this shared confusion and disturbance in the 
face of death. 
I don't know how many patients would be more helped than 
harmed by a new legal regime. I don't know how many physicians 
are actually struggling in the way that I have depicted. I don't know 
the importance for physicians' struggle of the currently regnant 
legal distinction between refusing life-prolonging treatment and 
hastening death. I don't know how many physicians consciously 
disregard these distinctions and purposely hasten their patients' 
death; and among these law-breaking physicians, I don't know how· 
many find the condemnation of their acts in the formal-though 
not enforced-law to be a welcomed inhibition, a secretly reassur­
ing constraint that mirrors their own discomfort with their actions. 
But for all that I do not know, I am confident that if we ignore all of 
these uncertainties and change the legal regime in a way that deeply 
unsettles the current conception of physician-patient relations, and 
directly contravenes the conventional proposition that "good physi­
cians do not kill patients," we cannot now know who and how many 
will be hurt more than helped. 
Some people say that the current legal regime itself makes it 
impossible to resolve these questions as well as many other uncer­
tainties, that we can never find answers until physician-assisted sui­
cide is practiced openly and is thereby amenable to public scrutiny 
and regulation.16 The paradox in this position is that we can't gain 
adequate knowledge about whether we want to change our social 
arrangements until after we change our arrangements. The para­
dox equally afflicts those who resist change for fear of its unknown 
consequences. Perhaps it is possible to try small dosages of legal 
change, to self-consciously experiment in these matters in order to 
test their consequences without committing ourselves irrevocably to 
the questionable changes in social practice and self-conceptions. 
But of this, too, I am confident: that constitutionally mandated 
16. See Franklin Miller et aI., Regufllting Physician-Assisted Death, 331 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 119, 120 (1994); see also Lawrence Gostin, Drawing a Line Between Killing and 
Letting Die: The Law, and Law Reform, on Medically Assisted Dying, 21 J.L. MEo. & 
ETHICS 94, 98 (1993). But cf. Ann Alpers & Bernard Lo, Physician-Assisted Suicide in 
Oregon: A Bold Experiment, 274 JAMA 483 (1995). 
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change in the existing legal regime is not a sufficiently fine-tuned 
instrument for this kind of experimentation. 
The sweepingly incautious and abrupt character of the consti­
tutional rulings by the Second and Ninth Circuits is, in many ways, . 
the most extraordinary aspect of these decisions. The practical ef­
fect of these rulings, if they are affirmed by the Supreme Court, 
would be to overturn the legal regime in every state except for Ore­
gon. Assisted suicide is now explicitly prohibited in some 26 states 
and would almost certainly be considered criminally punishable in 
other states that have not clearly authorized the practice,17 Only 
Oregon has explicitly approved physician-assisted suicide; this ap­
proval occurred in a popular referendum in 1994 and, because of a 
pending constitutional challenge, the law has not yet come into ef­
fect. 1s Accordingly, the constitutional right found by the circuit 
courts had been recognized by almost no other authoritative body 
and had not been practically implemented anywhere in the entire 
country. 
According to the formal ideology of constitutional law, this vir­
tually total absence of popular recognition should have no signifi­
cance: constitutional rights are supposed to override popular 
approval, not depend on it. It is nonetheless striking that the circuit 
court rulings are further removed from any popular recognition, 
and more abruptly imposed in the face of popular resistance, than 
any other judicial ruling in the history of the constitutional adjudi­
cative enterprise. For sheer scope of judicial ambition, the closest 
precedents in this century, and even in our entire history, are the 
Supreme Court's rulings in Brown v. Board ofEducation 19 and Roe 
v. Wade.20 But Brown overturned race segregation laws in effect 
only in a minority of states (essentially in the former Confederacy 
and a few immediately bordering states). Moreover, before issuing 
its constitutional proclamation that separate race facilities were "in­
herently unequal," the Court had issued a highly visible series of 
decisions during the preceding fifteen years that incrementally but 
steadily undermined the constitutionally approved status of the 
17. See James Bopp & Richard Coleson, The Constitutional Case against Permit­
ting Physician-Assisted Suicide for Competent Adults with "Terminal Conditions," 11 
ISSUES L. & MED. 239, 249 n.42 (1995). 
18. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995). 
19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
20. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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"separate but equal formula."21 And immediately after formally 
proclaiming its new doctrine in Brown, the Court announced that 
this ruling would be implemented only gradually; "with all deliber­
ate speed,"22 was the Court's cautious watchword for fourteen years 
after its apparently sweeping decision in Brown. The Court aban­
doned this self-conscious incrementalism only after the United 
States Congress had enacted three landmark Civil Rights laws, in 
1964, 1965 and 1968, that signified overwhelming national popular 
approval for the course that the Court had cautiously embraced in 
1954.23 
Roe v. Wade was a more precipitous imposition of judicial au­
thority than Brown had been. There is even some reason to think 
that the Justices construed the apparent popular approval of the 
Court's exercise of authority in Brown as a generalized endorse­
ment of its role as constitutional censor and thus emboldened it re­
garding the abortion controversy. But even so, Roe was a less 
radical departure from the existing and popularly approved legal 
regime than the current circuit court assisted suicide rulings. When 
Roe was decided in 1973, abortion was a legally recognized medical 
procedure in every state, though in some two-thirds of the states 
limited only to save the mother's life. In one-third of the states, 
however, legal abortion was available under relatively liberalized 
circumstances (typically to protect the "mental" as well as general 
"physical health" of the mother)24-so liberal that in some of these 
states, at least, abortion was practically available on demand.25 
Moreover, during the three years prior to Roe, the legislatures of 
four states-New York, Washington, Alaska and Hawaii-had ex­
plicitly approved abortions on demand.26 Thus, when the Court 
proclaimed in Roe that states could not constitutionally prohibit a 
first-trimester abortion requested by a woman and accepted by her 
personally chosen physician, there was considerable prior popular 
approval of and extensive prior social experience with the medical 
21. See Robert A. Burt, Constitutionalizing Physician-Assisted Suicide: Will 
Lightning Strike Thrice?, 35 DUQ. L. REv. 159, 159-60 (1996). 
22. Brown v. Board of Educ. II, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). 
23. See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
24. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 139-40,40 n.37; MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND 
DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 48 (1987). 
25. See KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLmcs OF MOTHERHOOD 88-95 
(1984) (regarding California law). 
26. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 46-50 
(1990). 
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practice. There is nothing like this prior approval and no prior ex­
perience at all with legally recognized physician-assisted suicide. 
This apparently unprecedented character of the exercise of ju­
dicial authority in the physician-assisted suicide cases-its distance 
from popularly accepted practice and its abrupt sweep-does not 
necessarily demonstrate its wrongfulness as a matter of constitu­
tional principle. The logic of constitutional decision-making is not 
rigidly confined by past precedent. John Marshall's famous declara­
tion in 1819 that "we must never forget, that it is a constitution we 
are expounding"27 apparently endorses an expansive interpretive 
role for the judiciary in construing the sparse terminology of the 
constitutional document. This formulation can readily support an 
equally expansive conception of judicial authority; the sweeping 
moral proclamation enunciated in Brown might in retrospect 
eclipse its cautious incrementalism in implementation-a retrospec­
tive reading which is given impetus by Roe and finds full flowering 
in a judicial proclamation that extends Roe's substantive privacy 
principle to overturn state laws banning physician-assisted suicide.28 
I cannot refute the internal coherence of this constitutional argu­
ment. My instrumental concerns about 'the unknown consequences 
of the radical, abrupt shift in social practice regarding legal recogni­
tion of physician-assisted suicide are, within the internal logic of 
this argument, subordinate to the command of constitutional princi­
ple. This command is reminiscent of the old legal maxim fiat jus­
tida ruat coe/i, "let justice be done though the heavens fall." 
Though some might wish that this instrumental consequence could 
be somehow averted, proscribing injustice may nonetheless be pref­
erable, a more noble if riskier course. 
The very idea of constitutional justice depends, however, on a 
methodology of rational discourse: on the possibility of reasoned 
argument conducted in a language with acknowledged intersubjec­
tive meaning. The conventional depiction of this methodology 
treats rationality rather like a ticket of admission for participation 
in moral discourse; the participants are obliged, that is, to come into 
the enterprise already committed to and engaged in the use of ob­
jective reasoning and mutually recognized language. This is, how­
ever, a misleading depiction; rationality is better conceived as the 
goal of moral discourse not as its precondition. 
27. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). 
28. See Robert A. Burt, Alex Bickel's Law School and Ours, 104 YALE L.J. 1853, 
1868-69 (1995). 
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For most questions, the difference between these two depic­
tions may not be especially sharp or consequential. For most ques­
tions, interchange-even among passionate adversaries-rather 
quickly finds a common language, a shared understanding of the 
terms of the argument, even if ultimate substantive agreement does 
not readily emerge. There are some issues, however, where these 
preconditions for rational deliberation are not easily reached­
where the very terms of discourse are heavily freighted with subjec­
tive and ordinarily inexpressible significance for one or another of 
the participants. In deliberations about such issues, the goal of ra­
tionality may seem unattainable and, at the same time, the costs of 
abandoning that goal may seem enormous and even terrifying. The 
social costs may involve resort to violence as the only means of ad­
dressing a high stakes but apparently irresolvable conflict. The in­
dividual costs may involve a frightening sense of personal isolation 
and incoherence as a consequence of the inability to make one's 
deeply felt needs intelligible, much less persuasive to others. For 
such issues, these fears set the stage for a kind of forced march to 
an apparent rationality-a suppression of, an intolerance for, rather 
than a comfortable resolution of the radical subjectivities that are 
obstructing the cherished goal of mutual intelligibility. Sometimes 
this suppression may itself be a mutually shared enterprise, an im­
plicit or unacknowledged agreement to ignore the mutual inability 
to find a common language or metric for resolving controversy. In 
such circumstances, the apparent resolution is usually quite tenu­
ous; disagreements and tensions are likely to arise soon and often.29 
At other times, one party who is for whatever reason stronger than 
the other simply imposes his terms on the dispute and overrides the 
persistent though deeply felt incommensurability of the other. This 
too is an unstable, but not uncommon, resolution. 
American society today seems transfixed by the problem of in­
commensurate disputes: conflicts that traverse the possibility not 
only of mutually satisfactory resolution but even of rational dis­
course. Our current struggle with the meaning of multicultural­
ism-whether recognition of racial, religious, ethnic, gender 
differences is inconsistent with or a pathway toward a unifying na­
tional self-definition-is one expression of this obsession. I believe 
29. For an insightful discussion of the social uses of tenuous dispute resolutions, 
see Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving Things Un­
decided, 110 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1996). 
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that the sudden public salience of disputes about death and dying is 
another such expression. 
If this is true, then public deliberations cannot begin with the 
assumption that the preconditions for rational moral discourse have 
been satisfied for these disputes. We must instead devise some 
means for engaging in a public deliberative process that can lead to 
a common language and commensurate metric for moral resolution 
of the dispute. Though judicial interventions can play a valuable 
facilitative role in this deliberative process, essentially by focussing 
public attention on the existence of deep moral conflict and offering 
guidance toward the possibilities of acknowledging shared prem­
ises, the judiciary-because of its social remoteness and its depen­
dence on rational principle-must not impose an authoritative and 
conclusive resolution of the dispute when its terms are still morally 
incommensurable, when the dispute is not yet amenable to rational 
discourse among the adversaries.30 
By this criteria, the Supreme Court's sweepingly conclusive 
resolution of the abortion controversy in Roe v. Wade was prema­
ture; and the morally incommensurable terms in which the abortion 
debate was then, and continues to be, debated also shows why the 
physician-assisted suicide controversy is still far from morally re­
solvable. The centrally disputed question in the abortion debate 
about whether the fetus is a "person" who is a recognized member 
of our social community in itself points to the absence of a shared 
morality to which the disputants can appeal. If we have no com­
mon basis for agreement on the identity of the constituent members 
of the community, there is no "we" to engage in discourse but only 
mutually unintelligible and therefore socially and morally isolated 
individuals. 
The "personhood" dispute points to one underlying theme in 
particular that is common to the claims about abortion and the right 
to die: that passage into or out of the human community involves 
extraordinary vulnerability; that the threats come not only or even 
primarily from biological risks but from social abuses; and that the 
medical profession is directly responsible for the infliction of these 
abuses. The proposed technique for protecting against abuse is also 
similar in the two contexts, though it differs in strategic details of 
30. My model for this kind of self-restrained, morally iIIuminating judicial 
pedagogy is the Supreme Court's carefully staged deliberative process in Brown v. 
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and during the sixteen years before and fourteen 
years after that decision. See ROBERT A. BURT, THE CoNSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 271­
310 (1992). 
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application. The basic protective technique is to control the timing 
of the socially recognized designation of "personhood." To guard 
against iatric abuse via abortion, the social status of "personhood" 
is bestowed at increasingly earlier stages of fetal and even embry­
onic biological development; to guard against iatric abuse via tech­
nological inflictions-mechanical ventilators, nasogastric tube 
feeding, etc.-.during the process of dying, the social status of "per­
sonhood" is revoked at increasingly earlier stages of biological de­
cline. There is one central strategic difference in establishing the 
locus for controlling the timing of this social proclamation. For the 
beginning of life, advocates for a "right to life" insist that "per­
sonhood" must be communally and univocally defined. For the end 
of life, advocates for a "right to die" insist that each individual must 
be free to revoke "personhood" by his or her own idiosyncratic 
conception, though constrained by a single communal conception of 
"mental competence" so that only a socially recognized "person" 
would be free to revoke "personhood. "31 
These strategic differences are of course significant; but the 
heated debates between these antagonists, regarding the virtues of 
pluralist vs. univocal standards of "personhood" at both the begin­
nings and the endings of life, have obscured a more fundamental 
similarity in perspective. Both camps view biological dependency 
as a fearful state of social isolation which is not just vulnerable but 
is highly likely to attract abuse. The imagery of a "silently scream­
ing" fetus, suffering terribly but unattended, has been popularized 
by right to life advocates, but it is an equally apt image for the fear­
ful invocations by right to die advocates of dying people intubated 
and tethered to high-tech machinery in impersonal hospital or nurs­
ing home settings. 
This commonality between the pro-life and pro-choice advo­
cates-their shared sense of social isolation and vulnerability-is, 
ironically enough, the basis for their shared diagnosis that the medi­
cal profession in particular has betrayed its caretaking role and is 
the principal source of abuse. This common ground is not, how­
ever, a comfortable basis for enlisting physicians, as a group or as 
31. For "mentally incompetent" people, some advocate a communally and univo­
cally defined standard to revoke personhood for those without various indicia of cogni­
tive or "higher brain" function. Opponents of the "right to die" claim that this 
revocation would inevitably and exponentially expand over current categories of senile 
and mentally retarded people. For many difficulties in applying standards of mental 
incompetence and voluntariness regarding requests for physician-assisted suicide, see 
Burt, supra note 21, at 164-77. 
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individuals, in any socially ameliorative enterprise. It may be that 
the physicians who choose to perform abortions are sufficiently ha­
bituated to an impersonal conception of fetal status that they have 
no difficulty in declining to see themselves as murderers. The wide­
spread, openly acknowledged practice of legalized abortions 
throughout the United States prior to Roe v. Wade did provide 
some basis for confidence on this score. On the available evidence 
regarding physician-assisted suicide, however, there is much less 
grounds for comfort. Physicians who feel troubled about assisted 
suicide would, as with abortion practice, be free to refuse participa­
tion. But if my speculation is correct-if the psychological stakes 
are as high as I believe for physicians in particular, and if the psy­
chological mechanisms of denial or other suppressions or displace­
ments of disturbing thoughts are as readily available as I believe­
the stage is set for much confusion between physicians and patients, 
much self-justificatory and self-protective conduct by physicians 
and persistent, perhaps even intensified, experience of social isola­
tion by patients. This is not a confidence-engendering basis for 
communal embrace of practice which depends on subtle and sym­
pathetic appreciation by physicians of their patients' hard-to-articu­
late ambivalences and fears; but adequately protective 
implementation of physician-assisted suicide crucially requires this 
capacity. 
The unusual abruptness of the judicial intervention by the Sec­
ond and Ninth Circuit courts, the fact that both courts were in effect 
prepared to impose on the entire country through constitutional 
command a practice that had been approved only recently in just 
one state and not yet implemented even there, was an effort to 
reach moral resolution by a forced-march to close off, rather than 
to confront difficult questions. 
Is it possible that there is no just result regarding physician­
assisted suicide? Is it possible that there is no uniform evaluative 
matrix for weighing the conflicting needs and interests of vulnera­
ble people who will be harmed by its legalized availability and self­
assured people who will be helped by it, and therefore no justified 
basis for bestowing the trumping card of "rights-bearer" on one of 
these claimants? Is it possible that death so utterly dissolves per­
sonal identity, the conventionally conceived "self" engaged in mu­
tually recognized interchange with others, that the preconditions 
for our social conceptions of moral discourse are traversed, that 
death itself renders rationality and justice unrecognizable? The 
judges in the ruling majorities of the Second and Ninth Circuit ap­
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parently denied these possibilities; but they must be sympathetically 
considered. 
